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Ethics are central to social education, and making ethi-
cal decisions underlies the purpose of teaching critical think-
ing and interpretive skills in the classroom. The point in ac-
quiring these skills is to apply them in the real world when 
deciding "what ought to be," "right from wrong," and "good 
from bad." Few educational philosophers would disagree up 
to this point. However, when discussion begins on how to 
teach ethics, beliefs diverge considerably. 
Ironically, both the extreme left and extreme right wings 
of educational thought seek the same end, that of ethics 
inculcation. Inculcation of anything is a dangerous if not 
unethical proposition. Inculcation is a pernicious method, used 
by totalitarian states, that runs counter to student-centered, 
progressive education in a democratic society. The logical 
response to the maligning realities of inculcation is that some 
ethical behaviors, such as honesty or bravery, are intrinsi-
cally "good" and deserve teacher modeling and wholesale 
student acceptance. But buying into any value, without logi-
cally arriving at the utility of such a value for a particular 
situation, renders it meaningless for the student. For instance, 
many situations dictate that we must not be honest or brave 
to attain an ethically and positively "good" outcome. Thus, 
rather than inculcation, ethics in a democratic society must 
be taught as a flexible system, arrived at through logic and 
reason, that ultimately situates students to act in ways that 
are ethically sound. 
This thesis unfolds in five parts. The first begins with 
the premise that social education is central to education and 
that ethics are the par excellence of social education. The 
second part deals with the far left of the educational spec-
trum, specifically the inculcating views of multiculturalists. 
The third area focuses on the conservative side, and its push 
for certain unquestionable universal ethical codes. An eclec-
tic solution, based primarily on the philosophy of Deweyan 
pragmatism and various ethical theories, follows the conser-
vative view and offers progressive alternatives to this most 
essential element of education. The final section contains the 
implications of teaching ethics in schools in light of these 
three perspectives, with a view toward further inquiry. 
The Centrality of Ethics Education 
When we reflect on why we ultimately teach certain 
topics, why we teach in certain ways, and what we want 
students to be able to do after their experience in social 
education, the answer is almost always the same. We want 
students to think critically; to be inquisitive; to be a positive 
and active member of society; to be a good citizen; and to 
have tolerance, honesty, character, integrity, and generosity. 
Formed by its largest professional organization, the primary 
purpose of social educa t ion is to "he lp young people 
develop the ability to make informed and reasoned decisions 
for the public good as ci t izens of a culturally diverse, 
democratic society in an interdependent world."1 The focus 
of this statement is decisions or, stated more precisely, 
ethical decision making, which is the business of social 
education. Others build upon this broad defini t ion and 
suggest that the point of our work is to help students attain 
civic competence and become familiar with the skills and 
dispositions that are necessary for active membership in a 
democratic society.2 Still others view social education as hav-
ing an a priori r e cons t ruc t ion i s t pu rpose , where the 
ultimate goal is to position students to be part of a new social 
order that reconstructs society along the lines of social 
justice and reform.3 
All of these goals and desired outcomes have one com-
monality. Each mission requires that in some capacity we 
want students to be able to reason, think, and determine what 
ought to be. The reason why students must learn these so-
phisticated skills is to be able to make informed ethical deci-
sions, which is further translated into being a positive influ-
ence in society. Thus, since ethics are central to the purposes 
of social education, it seems odd that ethical philosophy, and 
philosophy in general, is rarely offered as a course, and a 
rigorous treatment of the topic is not found in most class-
rooms. When realized in the powerful light of philosophy, 
the arguments for the appropriate methods of teaching ethics 
are exceedingly divergent and polemic. The educational 
philosophy that espouses relativism and multiculturalism 
attempts to equate cultural norms, at the expense of cultural 
universals, which is a problematic assertion at best. 
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Far-Left, Multiculturalism, and Relativism 
Most multiculturalists view cultural values as a remedy 
for educational issues and suggest that the cardinal mission 
of the public schools is to develop in students values related 
to this view. Many multiculturalists posit that a student's edu-
cation should be centered in his or her own cultural value 
system.4 It follows logically that education should form around 
arbitrary cultural value systems, which is a direct inculcation 
of relativist ethics. Multiculturalists suggest that ethical codes 
are subjectively, politically, and culturally contextualized, the 
result of which is that no knowledge claim has universal va-
lidity and no consensus on rules and values can be achieved. 
Furthermore, multiculturalists use a theory that denies the 
possibility of consensus, since all standards are politically 
and culturally determined.5 The logical conclusion of these 
multicultural views is that all cultures have ethical codes that 
are legitimate in themselves, simply by nature of emanating 
from a "culture," and each culture's ethical system is rela-
tively equal to any other. Giving ethical license to any group 
based on achieved status as a "culture" not only skirts the 
issue of having to "offend anyone," it is also intellectually 
perplexing. By not being critical of cultures, including our 
own, and their ethical beliefs, we run the risk of never achiev-
ing any sort of ethics education based on a democratically 
oriented habit of mind. 
Cultural relativism seeks to avoid ethical issues because 
each culture will maintain a sacrosanct stance. Rather than 
rationally seeking a resolution to ethical issues, relativists 
suggest that each culture can construct its own values for its 
own members, but these values should neither be used to judge 
other societies, nor should other societies judge them. Once 
the members of one culture define the ethical "good," dis-
cussion of the issue apparently ends and the opportunity for 
further discourse ceases.6 The result of cultural relativism is 
intellectual and ethical stagnation, where the search for com-
mon knowledge and progress halts. 
The oppressive nature of rational, analytic, and logical 
thought is central to radical educational theory, postmodernist 
theory, and relativism. Postmodernists seek to break from 
"hegemonic logic"7 due to its supposed intrusion on cultures 
that rely more on emotions and relationships to find resolu-
tions to ethical dilemmas. This idea naturally falls apart when 
we start to discuss international human rights, the mutila-
tions of genitalia in certain cultures, as well as demonstra-
tions by extremist groups in the United States. Contradic-
tions abound as witnessed by relativists who seek ethnic in-
dependence but at the same time protest "international is-
sues." However, before we examine the implications of in-
culcating relativism as the only correct ethical code, we must 
first examine ethical relativism itself. 
Relativism posits a central argument that (a) morally right 
and wrong actions vary from society to society, so there are 
no universal moral standards held by all societies; (b) whether 
or not it is right for individuals to act in a certain way de-
pends on the society to which they belong; and (c)therefore, 
there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply 
to all people, everywhere, and at all times.8 The first disturb-
ing consequence of this theory is that reformers are always 
morally wrong since they go against the tide of cultural stan-
dards, resulting in a conclusion of progress as being "unethi-
cal." A second argument is that if moral relativism is true, 
neither law nor civil disobedience will have a firm founda-
tion. Civil disobedience would be morally wrong if a culture 
agrees with the law in question, hence any "petition of griev-
ances" as found in the United States Constitution, would be 
unethical. Another problem associated with relativism is that 
it is extremely difficult to define a culture or society. The 
definition of certain cultures may stem from history, litera-
ture, language, ancestry, religion or geographic concern, and, 
of course, race. Thus, if we deduce that every individual has 
a distinct "culture," we might abandon any sort of rational 
ethical, judicial, or political system. Ultimately, one could 
justify any action through cultural approval, and therefore 
we must view the perpetuation of such an action as a correct 
e thical dec is ion . 9 All of th is , of course , appl ies to a 
multicultural, rather than monocultural, society. 
The Far-Right, Conservatism, and Universalism 
The far-right's ethical education theory is much easier to 
define, for they seek to inculcate a specific set of unques-
tioned values, rather than a general code. One sect within 
this group is the moral literacy movement of Bennett, Keyes, 
Limbaugh, et al., which seeks to ensure social order via "fam-
ily religious values" in secular public schools.10 The camp 
headed by Diane Ravitch, though somewhat similar, seeks to 
preserve a sense of the American community." She and oth-
ers argue that if there is no community with an agreed upon 
vision of liberty and justice, then there will be but a collec-
tion of divergent racial and ethnic cultures. If no larger sense 
of community exists, then each group will want to teach their 
own children in their own way and public education will cease 
to exist.12 While a sound argument, it implies that room ex-
ists for only one vision of ethics education. William Bennett 
specifically defines what that singular vision should be. 
Bennett debunks moral relativism as well as the process 
of "values clarification," and he proposes ethics as a system 
of universal truths that can be taught through rote memoriza-
tion.13 These universal ethics, supported by culture through-
out time, must also be held by teachers. Bennett suggests that 
teaching and exposing children to good character and invit-
ing its imitation will transmit a moral foundation for ethics. 
Education arid Culture Winter 2001, Vol. XVII No . 1 
A N ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS INSTRUCTION 31 
He suggests that one cannot teach morality without being 
"committed to morality yourself."14 If teachers can consis-
tently act in ethically sound ways, with good moral charac-
ter, in specific situations whereby that character and morality 
is logically attained, it is an extraordinary and honorable goal. 
But having a teacher act out these set values, and the desire 
for students to follow these values, is f lawed on at least two 
counts. 
First, if students take on the assumption that being hon-
est is a moral action that should be universalized, they are 
not asked to come to that conclusion on their own. It is, as 
stated earlier, meaningless to ask students to accept virtues 
prima facie. Second, the case for "teaching ethics by example" 
can be cut down deontologically. For instance, the actions of 
a role model may contain malevolent motivations. Yet, the 
outcome of these actions may, in fact, be "ethically good." 
Nonetheless, their motivations remain inherently pernicious. 
Affinity for role models limits the ethical cause for both stu-
dent and teacher to teleological analysis, so that doing the 
right thing for the wrong reason is morally permissible. Even 
teaching about historical role models fails to offer any sub-
stantive ethical thought or reflection for the student. As Dewey 
noted: 
lessons about morals signify as a matter of course lessons in 
what other people think about virtues and duties. It amounts to 
something only in the degree in which pupils happen already 
to be animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the 
sentiments of others. Without such regard, it has no more in-
fluence on character than information about the mountains of 
Asia.15 
Beyond the case of role models, we must examine the 
dangers of holding certain values as universally true. This is 
a dangerous Hobbesian leap that borders on nazism, totali-
tarianism, and absence of thought. The first danger is that 
teachers, administrators, and communit ies that endorse spe-
cific ethical views as being universally true assume these 
views to not only be true, but unquestionable. Second, stu-
dents exit their education having learned that they should al-
ways act a certain way, without having had any thought pro-
cess that reaches the same conclusion. Finally, when acting 
in a society with an ethical f ramework that one holds to be 
universally true, intolerance and inflexibility will be the likely 
result. On a larger scale, universal ethics education is what 
totalitarian states have consistently used to sustain their re-
gimes. 
A totalitarian state (as the most extreme example of authoritar-
ian control) may take the position that the teacher ought to 
cause students (1) to adopt or "take on" certain very specific 
attitudes; (2) to develop a number of fairly specific habits ac-
quired through a multitude of prescribed activities; (3) to ac-
cept the orthodox pattern of beliefs and values, in terms of 
which the approved habits and attitudes fit together and make 
sense.16 
Bennett found the characteristics of thoughtfulness, kindness, 
honesty, respect for the law, knowing right f rom wrong, and 
love of country to be the most desirable.17 Teaching unques-
tioned patriotism and respect for the law undermines the en-
tire purpose of social education and the promotion of ratio-
nal thought in a democratic vein. 
Universalists seek to inculcate unquestioned values for 
many reasons. There is potential, if these values are ques-
tioned, that youth will accept the "wrong" beliefs if they open 
their minds to new ideas.18 Conservative assertions of uni-
versal virtues and truths naturally contain functionalist de-
sires to limit change. But skirting "closed areas" that are of-
ten saturated with prejudices and taboos creates intellectual 
and ethical stagnation.19 Progressive education in a democ-
racy demands the continual questioning of beliefs and asser-
tions. 
Kohlberg and Values Clarification 
An alternative to relativism and universalism is Lawrence 
Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. Kohlberg 's approach 
suggests that moral reasoning is rooted in one 's cognitive 
abilities. Contained in this theory, six stages of moral cogni-
tive development, with student ascension to the next highest 
stage through examination of moral di lemmas, is seen as the 
ideal. Conservatives criticize Kohlberg's approach stating that 
the outcome of moral reasoning is "moral nihilism."20 Rather 
than learning specific values, Kohlberg suggests that students 
grapple with di lemmas that tend to yield more sophisticated 
ethical domains. In addition to Kohlberg 's theory, the "val-
ues clarification movement" has drawn considerable reac-
tion. Values clarification elicits the judgment and opinions of 
a student with regard to a moment of "values dissonance." 
Values clarification does not go further than eliciting aware-
ness of values, however, and assumes that being aware of 
one 's values is an end in itself.21 Obviously, values clarifica-
tion does not go far enough, for it fails to utilize the last 2,500 
years of philosophical thought on the issue. 
Bennett has criticized the values clarification movement 
as an avenue for students to clarify wants and desires and 
asserting those as a form of ethical relativism.22 The moral 
d i lemma approach is criticized by some as wrongfully iden-
tifying a universally valid moral orientation that is histori-
cally and culturally particular.23 Kohlberg 's theory suggests 
pure reasoning, void of any inculcation, but relies too heavily 
upon cognitive development , albeit essential to our solution, 
and not enough on the multi tude of ethical theories and codes 
drawn f rom all cultures that students can use to solve moral 
di lemmas. 
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Implications of Ethics in Education 
Deciding what ethical systems are chosen and how they 
are taught is a divisive and volatile issue. For some it is one 
of the most important struggles for hegemony now being 
waged in American society.24 The way in which ethics are 
taught has cascading effects on social education. If relativ-
ism is the choice of ethics education, then what follows is 
typically a relativistic view of American culture in history, 
government, and sociology courses. An example of this per-
meating effect is any centric curriculum that attempts to de-
center any shared values, thus promoting societal divisive-
ness. 
A possible consequence of relativism in a multicultural 
society is the erosion of the community, or common unity, 
that holds us together (e.g. language, government, history, 
and literature). When this sort of multiculturalism is prac-
ticed and taught , individuals f ind membersh ip within 
balkanized groups. Ultimately these groups can promote a 
"centric" vision of education, particularly in history, whereby 
the history of their group gains dominance over all others. 
Militants of ethnicity contend that a main objective of public 
education should be the protection, strengthening, celebra-
tion, and perpetuation of ethnic origins and identities, the re-
sult of which only seems to nourish prejudices, differences, 
and antagonisms.25 When these centrist visions become in-
creasingly pronounced, they go beyond admirable histories 
of groups and enter into the realm of "bad history."26 Exces-
sive centrist education pursues sociopolitical goals that are 
not related to cultural freedom or intellectual excellence. In 
addition, centrist education is not even "multicultural" be-
cause it focuses on one particular race as having priority over 
others.27 
For example, some multiculturalists assert that African 
Americans have no ties to Europeans, and thus are deserving 
of alternative curriculums. This assertion is based on the 
premise that (a) African America has any connection to Af-
rica and (b)that Caucasian America has a conscious connec-
tion to Europe. Contained within the self affirmation and re-
culturization movements is an implied assertion that mem-
bers of an ethnic heritage perform better if the curriculum 
centers upon, and glorifies, their ethnic affiliation.28 Distort-
ing history for the purposes of creating cultural self-esteem 
marginalizes every ethnicities' rightful ownership of a com-
munal American History.29 
American History cannot help to have somewhat of a 
European bias, for its socio-political makeup stems mostly 
from the European experience. Yet, just as any supposed con-
nection of sixth generation immigrants to the Old World seems 
absurd, self-ethnification after 300 years in this country can 
be thought of as "play-acting."30 Creating a historically eth-
nic identity distinct from "American" has often resulted not 
from a people's movement, but rather due to a few, well-
established intellectuals, professors, and writers.31 If the sup-
posed ethnicity that ignores the presence of any collective 
American experience finds license in a curriculum, then the 
results could not be more debilitating.32 If the criterion for 
teaching becomes ethnic pride and self-esteem, which some 
suggest has already occured then the goals of education in a 
democratic state no longer matter. Certain things cannot be 
taught and areas closed off to conversation readily appear. If 
every ethnic or religious group claims the right to approve or 
veto what is taught in public schools, multiculturalism be-
comes ethnocentrism, which is an inherently racist and un-
democratic proposition.33 
The implications of conservative or universal notions of 
ethics education have equally nefarious consequences. Uni-
versalists such as Bennett say that values are the key to sta-
bility in society and they are best inculcated in the early years. 
He does not care how the values are acquired and would pre-
sumably prefer to avoid reasoning among students, as evi-
dent in the values clarification debate.34 If we consider that 
the logical progression of multiculturalism is ethnocentric and 
resistant to a continued conversation on all topics, it resembles 
the far-right. Conservative universalists also demand centrist 
goals and the closing of areas to conversation. Both views 
entertain many of the same thoughts in policy as do totalitar-
ian regimes. Pure indoctrination of "traditional" values, re-
gardless of ideological bent, appear not at all meaningful and 
only beget conclusions that have little or no thought support-
ing them. 
Thus, educators must instead focus on the reasoning of 
values. Telling a student what is right or wrong is not demo-
cratic, but defining ways of reaching a conclusion that in-
structs the morally "right" way to act is not only a teachable 
moment, it is the keystone of social education. We must be 
continually vigilant and aware of the omnipresent attempts 
of ethics inculcation in order to preserve the freedom to ques-
tion and reason, an inherent and necessary feature of educa-
tion in a democratic society. 
The Alternative: Dewey's Reflective Morality 
Dewey's conception of ethics in education offers an al-
ternative to relativism, universalism, and cognitive based eth-
ics education. For Dewey, the central purpose of schooling 
was to "develop in students a critical intelligence and dispo-
sition that would be consistent with their actions as socially 
responsible citizens"35 —a ringing endorsement for the cen-
trality of ethics education in social education. Dewey's con-
ception of "reflective morality" coincides with "reflective 
thinking," as it demands that students draw on moral experi-
ences and weigh ethical theories to conclude the proper ac-
tion. But Dewey noted that there can be no such thing as 
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reflect ive morality unless people seriously ask how they 
should act and why they should do so.36 In order for reflec-
tive morality to occur, "closed areas" must become open and 
any moral didacticism removed, making all personal and 
public di lemmas available for student reflection. 
Reflective morality is centered upon the notion of respice 
finem, or having the ends in view. In his Ethics. Dewey used 
the example of hedonism to illustrate respice finem: 
Consider how you will come out if you act upon the desire you 
now feel; count the cost. Calculate consequences over a pe-
riod of time. Circumspection, prudent estimate of the whole 
course of consequences set in train, is the precondition of at-
taining satisfaction or the Good. All folly and stupidity consist 
in failure to consider the remote, the long run, because of the 
engrossing and blinding power exercised by some present in-
tense desire.37 
Hedonism is an excellent example of an ethical code that 
offers students a logical choice for ethical action and a con-
sequence of that action. Even though Dewey was primarily 
teleological in disposition, he suggested consideration of the 
immediate ethical implicat ions themselves in addition to 
longer-term considerations. Dewey allowed for consultation 
of all theory when moving f rom motive to consequence, 
which is the usual fissure in ethical thought. Dewey bridged 
this distinction, for motive and consequence are not " two 
different things but two poles of the same thing."38 Reflec-
tive morality makes all possible ethical theories available for 
students to formulate decisions. For example, a student who 
views a situation in light of Hedonism might see their initial 
action as debilitating in the long term, which would suggest 
consultation of other ethical theories. 
What is central to the "ends in v iew" or respice finem 
approach to ethics education is to provide critical moral re-
f lect ion that does not al low for hard and fast rules. The 
"golden rule" is an example that provides a point of view 
that demands consideration of particular acts that aff irm the 
interests of others, as well as our own.39 Dewey warned against 
principles that have hard and fast rules and suggested that 
various theories are not rival systems that must be accepted 
or rejected en bloc, but rather as adequate methods of sur-
veying the problems of conduct so that " the student is put in 
a position to judge the problems of conduct for himself."40 
Dewey did not endorse respice finem wholesale because he 
understood the varied interpretations of the "end" with spe-
cific regard to students. The ethical f ramework of many high 
school students is Epicurean or Stoic in nature, which ac-
companies delusions of invincibility and general affinity for 
the ephemeral .4 1 Dewey suggested that these conceptions of 
the "end" are usually only afforded to the short-sighted or 
greedy individuals who only act with regard to ends that are 
immune to fluctuation.42 
Throughout their lives, students will come across situa-
tions where fol lowing a single principle, such as the golden 
rule, will not always create the best possible consequences 
for themselves or for others. Dewey believed that to go be-
yond simplistic guides, an essential element of moral inquiry 
needs achievement. This element is the transfer of the weight 
and burden of moral action to intelligence. The practical 
meaning of situations is not a lways self-evident, as certain 
principles would suggest, and therefore conflicting desires 
and alternatives must always be confronted.4 3 Inculcation of 
ethical beliefs denies the existence of alternatives, conflict-
ing beliefs, changing institutions, and personal choice. As 
Dewey noted, the development of reflective morality begins 
when one asks 
Why should I act thus and not otherwise? Why is this right and 
that wrong? What right has any one to frown upon this way of 
acting and impose that other way? Children make at least a 
start upon the road of theory when they assert that the injunc-
tions of elders are arbitrary, being simply a matter of superior 
position. Any adult enters the road when, in the presence of 
moral perplexity, of doubt as to what is right or best to do, he 
attempts to find his way out through reflection which will lead 
him to some principle he regards as dependable.44 
Asking students to accept the principles which teachers have 
attained through reflective morality, at face value, denies the 
reflective maturation process that is critical to active and per-
sistent participation in a democrat ic society. 
In addition to "ends in view," Dewey conceptualized a 
"virtue" or "habi t" f ramework that provides a general guide 
to conduct. The virtues and ethical habits Dewey referred to 
are always tentative, and never universal. A guide to conduct 
in this sense is meant solely as a skeleton of ethical decision-
making, a flexible f ramework that is applicable in every situ-
ation. Dewey suggests that habits are "adjustments to the 
environment,"4 5 which is similar to Piaget 's dialectic of cog-
nitive conflict, behavior, and environmental change.4 6 Dewey 
noted that "chastity, kindness, honesty, patriotism, modesty, 
toleration, bravery, etc., cannot be given a fixed meaning, 
because each expresses an interest in objects and institutions 
which are changing."4 7 We must therefore conclude that hab-
its and virtues are completely dynamic and must remain flex-
ible to new conditions, even those produced f rom prior ac-
tion. In this light, we cannot think dualistically and therefore 
must problemitze virtues and ethical di lemmas for students 
to grapple with a life of ethical "gray areas." The sine qua 
non of teaching ethics is a vision of flexibility, for the future 
problems and di lemmas of our students will not only be pre-
dominantly gray and fuzzy in nature, they will also draw upon 
infinitely different experiences, situations, and expectations. 
As Dewey noted: 
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... it is impossible to prepare the child for any precise set of 
conditions. To prepare him for the future life means to give 
him command of himself; it means to train him so that he will 
have the full and ready use of all his capacities; that his eye 
and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, that his 
judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under 
which it has to work and the executive forces be trained to act 
economically and efficiently.4K 
Progress and growth are also essential to Dewey ' s posi-
tion. Ethics education should not be conceived as a straight-
forward movement toward some distant ideal, nor should 
progress be viewed as resulting in final moral perfection. 
When progress occurs at all, it is through the guise of experi-
mentation and is only temporary, for progress itself creates 
new needs and problems.4 9 Reflective morality takes into ac-
count progress and the reality of inevitable change over time.50 
In order to enable Dewey ' s theory of ethical action with 
ends in view, w e must give students the tools to decide for 
themselves what ethical action is for a specific situation and 
how the consequences of that action can be analyzed. To do 
that, the instruction of a variety of codes, eclectically col-
lected f rom the annals of intellectual history, demand instruc-
tion. These codes offer perspectives on issues that illuminate 
every possible solution and therefore prepare students for all 
possible moral d i lemmas (see Table l) .5 1 
In addition, we could certainlv add a number of other 
theoretical codes, such as existentialism and justice theories. 
The point is that by having a firm understanding of these 
theories, s tudents would have a substantial knowledge base 
f rom which to assess and solve moral dilemmas. Dewey never 
offered a comprehensive list of virtues that would be akin to 
a "moral education curr iculum." He also asserted that the at-
tempt to set up " ready-made conclusions contradicts the very 
nature of reflective morality."52 Instead he offered a "general 
conception of virtue"5 3 that is eclectic in nature, and is flex-
ible for all students in all possible situations demanding a 
moral decision. Students need reflective morality in order to 
understand ethical standards and to "ascertain the criterion 
which insures their being just."5 4 
Conclusion 
Education in a democracy has no place for didactic peda-
gogy, in particular with regard to ethics education. When cur-
riculum is aligned to political and religious considerations, 
or the personal opinions of teachers, the educational inputs 
are not aligned with the development of students ' analytical 
and reasoning skills. If we want students to be critical think-
ers, we must then reject relativist and dogmatic theories of 
ethics. Critical thinking is not mere questioning or criticism 
for its own sake, but thinking in the sense of establishing 
premises and reasoning through to conclusions.5 5 Critical 
thinking is reflection built by specific intellectual standards 
and not by "correctness," romantic sociohistoric inaccura-
cies, or cultural conservatism, and it is essential to the per-
petuation of a democracy. 
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